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In our previous post, we learned what the Founding Fathers would think about The Avaricious Man. Today, Madison and Hamilton speculate about the promise that federal powers would remain ‘few and defined’—and the clause that made sure they didn’t.
Source: Federalist #44 — ‘Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States’ by James Madison
Source: Federalist #45 — ‘The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered’ by James Madison
In Federalist #44 and #45, published a day apart in January 1788, James Madison offered two assurances to a wary nation. The first: that the Necessary and Proper Clause was invulnerable—without it, the Constitution would be “a dead letter.” The second: that federal powers would remain “few and defined,” while the States retained authority over the lives, liberties, and properties of the people. Here, Madison and Hamilton exchange letters about the possibility that the first assurance devoured the second.
* * *
Philadelphia, February 2, 1788
My Dear Hamilton,
I have laid down my pen after completing the forty-fourth and forty-fifth numbers of our series, and find myself in an unusual temper—not doubt, precisely, but a restlessness I cannot quiet.
You will recall that I defended the clause empowering Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for executing its enumerated authorities. I called it invulnerable. I argued—and believed—that without such a provision the whole Constitution would be a dead letter, a catalogue of intentions with no instrument of execution. No axiom, I wrote, is more firmly established than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized.
Yet in the very next number I assured our readers that the powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined, while those remaining with the States are numerous and indefinite. War, commerce, treaties—these belong to the Union. The lives, liberties, and properties of the people—these belong to the States.
I confess, Hamilton, that when I place these two assurances side by side, a question presents itself that I did not adequately address: What if the means authorized by the first assurance should, over the course of generations, consume the limitations promised by the second?
Your faithful servant,
Js. Madison
* * *
New York, February 9, 1788
Dear Madison,
Your letter betrays a scruple where none is warranted—or at least none that was not already considered and accepted.
You wrote what was true: that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized. 
As to your promise that federal powers would remain few and defined—I remind you that I wrote with equal confidence that the regulation of the mere domestic police of a State holds out slender allurements to ambition. And I believed it. What ambitious man would trouble himself with the licensing of taverns or the width of county roads when the great affairs of nations beckon?
But I will confess this much: I assumed the allurements would remain slender because the ends would remain national. Should future Congresses discover that commerce touches everything—that the farmer’s crop, the shopkeeper’s hours, the physician’s practice all bear upon the trade between the States—then the means necessary and proper to regulate that commerce would reach into every quarter your forty-fifth number reserved to the States.
The clause is not the danger, Madison. The breadth of the end is the danger.
Yr. Obt. Servt.,
Hamilton
* * *
Montpelier, February 18, 1788
Dear Hamilton,
You have identified the difficulty with a precision I could not summon when I wrote those numbers. The clause itself is innocent. But the ends to which it attaches are not fixed in stone—they are fixed in language, and language is interpreted by men.
I told our readers that the people’s remedy against federal overreach was the same as their remedy against any legislative abuse: the ballot, the judiciary, the vigilance of the State assemblies. I believed—I still wish to believe—that these would suffice.
But consider: What if the people themselves should come to expect the central government to provide what the States once provided? What if they should petition not their local assemblies but the Congress for relief in matters of agriculture, of manufactures, of education, of the health of their families? The representatives, being men, will answer those petitions. And for each answer they will find, in the necessary and proper clause, the authority I assured the nation was invulnerable.
The danger is not that tyrants will seize the clause. The danger is that the people will hand it to them, gratefully, and call it good government.
Your servant,
Js. Madison
* * *
New York, February 25, 1788
Dear Madison,
Then we must be candid about what we built.
We designed a government that could find the power it needed. That was the purpose. That was why we rejected the Articles and their fatal word expressly. We gave Congress enumerated ends and flexible means, because we understood that no generation can foresee the necessities of the next.
If future Congresses exercise powers we did not imagine—if they regulate the farmer’s field, the merchant’s ledger, the conditions of labor in every workshop from the seaboard to the frontier—they will do so not in defiance of the Constitution but in fulfillment of its design. The clause works. The question you are truly asking is not whether implied powers will grow. They were meant to grow. The question is whether anyone will remember what was enumerated, and why the enumeration mattered.
I suspect they will not. And I suspect, Madison, that this troubles you more than it troubles me.
Ever yours,
Hamilton
* * * * *
If they only knew… that the clause Madison called indispensable would prove exactly that—not as a guardian of enumerated limits, but as the instrument that outgrew them. The powers are no longer few. They were never, as it turned out, defined. The dead letter Madison feared was not the Constitution without implied powers. It was his promise that implied powers would know their place.
Questions for Reflection:
- Madison promised that federal powers would be “few and defined.” Can you name a part of your daily life that the federal government does not regulate? Is that a failure of the Constitution—or proof the system works as designed?
- Hamilton argued the real question was not whether federal power would grow, but whether citizens would remember why limits existed in the first place. Do we?
- If you had to choose between a government powerful enough to solve any problem and a government confined to its original list of authorities, which would you choose—and what would you lose?
If these questions sparked something, leave a comment below. And if you think others should wrestle with them too, share this post.
Copyright © 2026 by Charles Cranston Jett
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What is the Necessary and Proper Clause?
The Necessary and Proper Clause is the final clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. It grants Congress the power to make all laws “necessary and proper” for carrying out its enumerated powers. James Madison defended it in Federalist #44 as essential to effective governance, arguing the Constitution would be “a dead letter” without it. The clause has been called the “Elastic Clause” because of its role in expanding federal authority beyond the powers explicitly listed.
Q: What did Madison mean by ‘few and defined’ powers?
In Federalist #45, Madison argued that the powers delegated to the federal government were “few and defined,” limited primarily to external matters such as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce. State powers, by contrast, were “numerous and indefinite,” covering the daily lives, liberties, and properties of citizens. Madison predicted that in peacetime, state governments would be larger and more influential than the federal government.
Q: What is the difference between enumerated and implied powers?
Enumerated powers are those explicitly listed in the Constitution, primarily in Article I, Section 8—including the power to tax, regulate commerce, coin money, and declare war. Implied powers are those not explicitly stated but considered necessary to carry out the enumerated powers, authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine of implied powers in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).
Q: How did McCulloch v. Maryland change the interpretation of federal power?
In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that Congress had the implied power to charter a national bank, even though banking is not an enumerated power. Marshall defined “necessary” broadly as “appropriate” or “conducive to the end” rather than “indispensable,” significantly expanding Congress’s ability to choose the means for executing its enumerated powers. The decision remains one of the most consequential in American constitutional law.
Q: What is the relationship between Federalist #44 and Federalist #45?
Both were written by James Madison and published a day apart in January 1788. Federalist #44 defends the Necessary and Proper Clause as essential for effective governance. Federalist #45 argues that federal powers are “few and defined” while state powers remain “numerous and indefinite.” Together, they represent Madison’s twin promises: that implied powers are harmless and that federal authority would stay limited. The tension between these assurances has shaped constitutional debate ever since.
Sources & Historical Context
This episode draws on Federalist #44 (“Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States”) and Federalist #45 (“The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered”), both written by James Madison and published in The New York Packet on January 25 and 26, 1788.
Primary sources are available through the National Archives’ Founders Online (https://founders.archives.gov/) and the Library of Congress Federalist Papers collection (https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50).
For the history of the Necessary and Proper Clause and its judicial interpretation, see the Library of Congress Constitution Annotated (https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C18-1/).
While these letters are imagined, the founders’ arguments are drawn from their actual writings. For the original documents, visit the National Archives’ Founders Online (https://founders.archives.gov/).