The Permanent Congress

A comparison of the Framers’ vision for legislative service with the reality of modern career politicians

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In Federalist No. 57, James Madison wrote what may be the most important sentence ever composed about representative government:

“The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.”

Wisdom. Virtue. The common good.

Madison was not describing career politicians. He was describing citizens who would step forward to serve, govern well, and then step back. He envisioned representatives who would—as he put it in the same essay—”anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised.”

Descend to the level from which they were raised.

That phrase deserves a moment of attention. Madison assumed that legislators would return to ordinary life. That the experience of governing would be temporary. That the voters’ judgment would send most of them home.

Today, the average Representative has served 8.6 years in the House. The average Senator has served 11.2 years. The longest-serving members have held their seats for more than four decades.

What happened?

What the Founders Actually Wrote

The Constitution sets minimal qualifications for Congress. A Representative must be twenty-five years old, a citizen for seven years, and a resident of the state. A Senator must be thirty, a citizen for nine years, and likewise a resident. That is all. No wealth requirement. No professional credential. No prior political experience.

Madison explained the reasoning in Federalist No. 52: “Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.”

The door was meant to be wide. Anyone of merit could enter.

But Madison also assumed they would exit. The Constitution required frequent elections precisely because—as he wrote—“it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”

Biennial elections for the House were designed to keep representatives close to those they served. Every two years, they would face the voters. Every two years, they would be reminded of their dependence on the people.

The Senate was different by design. Senators would serve six-year terms, staggered so that only one-third faced election in any given cycle. Madison explained in Federalist No. 62 that the Senate required “greater extent of information and stability of character”—qualities more likely to be found in those who had “reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages.”

The Senate was meant to be deliberative. Slower. More experienced. But even here, Madison assumed circulation rather than permanence. The longer term was meant to provide stability, not to create a class of lifetime legislators.

The Reality: Tenure by the Numbers

In the 19th century, the average tenure for Representatives hovered between two and three years. Senators averaged between three and five years. Turnover was common. Resignation was unremarkable. Many legislators served a term or two and returned to their farms, their law practices, their businesses.

The numbers tell the story of what changed.

By the early 1900s, average tenure began to climb. By mid-century, it had doubled. Today, Representatives average 8.6 years of service—nearly a four-fold increase since the Founders’ era. Senators average 11.2 years. And these are averages. Many members serve far longer.

Chuck Grassley has been in the Senate for 44 years. Harold Rogers and Christopher Smith have each served 44 years in the House. Robert Byrd served 51 years in the Senate before his death. John Dingell served 59 years in the House.

Fifty-nine years.

Madison wrote that representatives should “descend to the level from which they were raised.”

What level does a member descend to after six decades in office?

The Accountability Question

The Founders built accountability into the structure of elections. In Federalist No. 57, Madison listed five restraints on congressional abuse of power. The fourth was most direct: “The House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.”

Habitual recollection of dependence.

The phrase suggests something more than standing for election. It suggests a psychological condition—a constant awareness that power is borrowed, temporary, and subject to recall. Madison assumed this awareness would shape behavior. A representative who might be sent home would govern differently than one who expects to stay forever.

Modern reelection rates suggest that habitual recollection has faded. Incumbents win at extraordinary rates. Once elected, most members remain until they choose to leave. The voters’ judgment, which Madison considered the primary restraint, rarely operates as intended.

This is not a partisan observation. Career politicians exist in both parties. The incentive structure rewards incumbency regardless of ideology. Committee assignments, fundraising networks, name recognition, and gerrymandered districts all favor those already in office.

The Founders did not anticipate any of this. They assumed competitive elections would produce regular turnover. They assumed the fear of defeat would discipline behavior. They assumed that most legislators would serve briefly and go home.

Hamilton’s Counterargument

To be fair, not all the Founders favored rotation. In Federalist No. 72, Alexander Hamilton argued against term limits for the executive. His reasoning is worth considering.

Hamilton believed that the possibility of reelection would motivate good behavior. “An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity… to make the best use of the opportunity he had.” In other words, term limits might encourage corruption rather than prevent it.

Hamilton also valued experience. The knowledge gained in office, he argued, should not be discarded lightly. Continuity of leadership provided stability. Frequent changes disrupted effective governance.

These arguments have force. They explain why the Constitution imposed no term limits on Congress. The Founders trusted elections to produce the turnover they considered healthy. But Hamilton was writing about the executive, not the legislature. And he assumed that elections would function as intended—that voters would remove bad leaders and retain good ones based on performance.

He did not anticipate a system in which incumbency itself became the dominant advantage, where reelection rates approached 95%, where the average member served longer than Madison ever imagined possible. The question is not whether experience has value. It does. The question is whether a permanent legislative class is what the Founders had in mind when they designed a republic.

What They Would Recognize—and What They Wouldn’t

The Founders would recognize the structure of Congress. The House and Senate still function as designed—two chambers with different characters and different terms, checking each other and the executive.

They would recognize the qualifications. Anyone of merit may still serve. No property requirement. No religious test. No aristocracy of birth.

But the composition would startle them. Legislators who entered in their thirties and remain into their eighties. Members who have never held private employment as adults. Professional politicians whose entire careers consist of seeking and holding office.

Madison wrote in Federalist No. 57 that representatives would enter public service under circumstances that “cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents.”

Temporary affection. The phrase assumes the affection would be temporary because the service would be temporary.

Today, the affection—if that is the right word—is permanent. Constituency service has become a career. Legislation has become a profession. The citizen-legislator has given way to the professional politician.

Whether this serves the republic better than what Madison envisioned is a question worth asking.

The answer is not obvious.

Experienced legislators understand procedure, build relationships, and develop policy expertise. But they also accumulate obligations, distance themselves from ordinary life, and forget what it means to be governed by the laws they write.

Madison assumed they would remember. He assumed they would go home and live under their own handiwork. He assumed they would “descend to the level from which they were raised.”

Most no longer descend. Most no longer expect to.

And that may be the most important difference between the Congress the Founders designed and the Congress we have inherited.

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