The Founders Wrote It Down – The Question Is Whether We’ll Read it!
“The state is an agent for the federal government in elections. I don’t know why the federal government doesn’t do them anyway.”
These words were spoken not by a monarch or a dictator, but by the sitting President of the United States on February 4, 2026. President Trump, doubling down on his call to “nationalize” elections, characterized states as mere administrative arms of federal power—a claim that would have astonished every man who signed the Constitution.
The proposal has sparked immediate constitutional pushback.
Federal courts have already blocked portions of executive orders attempting to wrest election control from states. Legal scholars across the political spectrum have called the idea “flatly unconstitutional.” Even the Heritage Foundation—architect of much of the current administration’s policy agenda—maintains that it “will always oppose a federal takeover of our elections.”
But what would the men who actually founded this nation say? What did they intend when they crafted Article I, Section 4—the Elections Clause that has governed American elections for 237 years?
The answer requires listening to voices that rarely agreed on anything. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists fought bitterly over the Constitution’s ratification. Yet on this question—the question of whether the federal government should control elections—their words form a remarkable chorus of warning. And one voice rises above the rest: a man who would become President, warning against the very power another President now seeks to claim.
The Text They Actually Wrote
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution reads:
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”
The structure is deliberate. States hold primary authority. Congress—not the President—retains a backup power to alter regulations by law. The executive branch is mentioned nowhere. This was not an oversight. It was the design.
The Federalists Speak
The Federalists wanted a stronger central government than the Articles of Confederation provided. They believed in national power. Yet even they—especially they—understood why election control must remain with the states.
Alexander Hamilton: The Architect of Federal Power
No founder argued more forcefully for a powerful federal government than Alexander Hamilton. He wanted a national bank, a standing army, and an energetic executive. If anyone might have supported federal election control, it would have been him.
He did not.
In Federalist No. 59, Hamilton devoted an entire essay to defending the Elections Clause—specifically, why states must hold primary authority over federal elections. His reasoning cuts directly against any claim that states are mere “agents” of federal power:
“Nothing can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy.”
Note what Hamilton feared: not federal control, but the possibility that states might refuse to hold federal elections at all. His solution was not to give the federal government primary control, but to grant Congress—and only Congress—a backup power to intervene if states failed in their duties.
Hamilton continued:
“Every Government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation.”
This is the key insight. Hamilton argued for congressional backup authority precisely to preserve the Union against state dysfunction—not to enable federal takeover of functioning state systems. The power was defensive, not offensive. A failsafe, not a mandate.
Were Hamilton to hear a President claim that states are “agents” of federal power in elections, he would recognize it as the very inversion of the constitutional order he helped create. The Constitution makes the federal government dependent on state election administration—not the reverse.
James Madison: The Father of the Constitution
James Madison, the primary architect of the Constitution, understood the balance of power better than anyone. In Federalist No. 45, he described the relationship between federal and state governments with precision:
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”
Election administration was chief among those “numerous and indefinite” state powers. Madison did not view this as a bug in the constitutional system—it was the feature. State control of elections was a structural check against tyranny.
In Federalist No. 52, Madison addressed congressional elections directly, emphasizing that representatives would be elected “by the great body of the people of the United States”—not selected by federal authorities. The states, closest to the people, would administer the process.
Madison’s entire theory of republican government rested on divided power. Concentrate election control in any single authority—especially the executive—and you invite the very tyranny the Constitution was designed to prevent.
The Anti-Federalists Speak
The Anti-Federalists opposed ratification. They feared the Constitution granted too much power to the federal government. Their warnings about federal overreach—dismissed as paranoid by some in 1788—read today like prophecy.
“Brutus”: The Voice of State Sovereignty
Writing under the pen name “Brutus” (likely Robert Yates, a New York judge), this Anti-Federalist warned repeatedly that federal power would inevitably expand to absorb state authority. In his essays, he argued that distant, centralized government could not maintain republican accountability:
“In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar… if they be not, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other.”
Brutus believed that only local and state governments could remain truly responsive to the people. Federal administration of elections would sever the vital connection between citizens and their representatives.
His broader concern was that broad constitutional clauses—including the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause—would be used to justify federal absorption of state functions. He wrote:
“Centralization threatens state autonomy and could gradually erode local control over governance and elections.”
The Anti-Federalists lost the ratification debate. But their fears of federal overreach were taken seriously enough that the Tenth Amendment was added to the Bill of Rights, explicitly reserving to the states all powers not granted to the federal government.
“Cato”: The Warning About Election Manipulation
Writing as “Cato” (likely George Clinton, Governor of New York), this Anti-Federalist focused specifically on the Elections Clause—the very provision now at issue. His warning was pointed and specific:
“Congress may establish a place… at a time… inconvenient to attend; and by these means destroy the rights of election.”
Cato understood that control over election mechanics—times, places, manner—was control over election outcomes. Those who set the rules could manipulate the results. This was why primary authority had to remain with the states, closest to and most accountable to the voters themselves.
The Federalists responded to Cato’s concerns by emphasizing that Congress’s override power was limited and shared—requiring both houses of Congress to agree on any changes. The executive was deliberately excluded. No single person could dictate election rules.
Cato would recognize immediately what a President claiming states are his “agents” in elections represents: the precise danger he warned against 238 years ago.
The President Who Understood the Danger
Thomas Jefferson was not present at the Constitutional Convention—he was serving as Minister to France. He wrote no Federalist or Anti-Federalist papers. But Jefferson offers something the others cannot: the voice of a President articulating why federal overreach threatens the Republic itself.
In 1791, as Secretary of State, Jefferson wrote to President Washington opposing the creation of a national bank. His argument went far beyond banking—it struck at the heart of constitutional interpretation and the limits of federal power:
“I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people… To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”
— Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, February 15, 1791
A boundless field of power. No longer susceptible of any definition. Jefferson understood that constitutional limits exist precisely because unlimited power becomes indefinable—and indefinable power becomes tyranny.
The Constitution does not grant the federal government power over election administration. It explicitly assigns that power to the states, with a limited congressional override. For a President to claim that states are merely federal “agents” in elections is to take precisely the “single step beyond the boundaries” that Jefferson warned would open a boundless field of power.
Nine years later, as Jefferson prepared to assume the presidency himself, he wrote to Gideon Granger with a warning that reads as if written for our moment:
“Our country is too large to have all its affairs directed by a single government. Public servants at such a distance, and from under the eye of their constituents, must, from the circumstance of distance, be unable to administer and overlook all the details necessary for the good government of the citizens; and the same circumstance, by rendering detection impossible to their constituents, will invite public agents to corruption, plunder and waste.”
— Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger, August 13, 1800
Distance from the people invites corruption. Jefferson was not speaking abstractly—he was describing a principle of republican government. Those who administer elections must be close enough to the people to be held accountable. Move that administration to a distant federal authority, and you have removed the very mechanism of accountability that makes elections meaningful.
Jefferson became President five months after writing those words. He understood the temptations of executive power from the inside. And he understood that a President who controls the elections that determine his own power has ceased to be accountable to anyone.
Where Enemies Agreed
The Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed on nearly everything. They fought over the structure of government, the Bill of Rights, the scope of federal power, and the dangers of centralization. Hamilton and Jefferson became bitter political enemies whose feud shaped the first party system.
But on the question of election control, their positions converged on essential points:
- States must hold primary authority over election administration. Both sides agreed that the Constitution placed this power with state legislatures, not the federal government.
- Congressional backup power is limited and shared. The Federalists defended Congress’s override authority as a necessary failsafe; the Anti-Federalists worried it could be abused. Neither contemplated presidential control.
- The executive has no constitutional role in election administration. The Elections Clause mentions states and Congress. The President is absent from the text for a reason.
- Centralized control invites manipulation. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood that whoever controls election mechanics can influence election outcomes.
- Distance from the people invites corruption. Jefferson’s warning applies directly: federal administrators, far from the voters they serve, cannot be held accountable the way local officials can.
If They Only Knew
What would the founders say if they could hear a President claim that states are merely “agents” of federal power in elections? That the federal government should “take over” voting?
- Hamilton would note that the Constitution he defended does not grant the executive any role whatsoever in election administration—and that he specifically argued against concentrated federal control.
- Madison would observe that the claim inverts the constitutional structure entirely. The federal government exists because states created it—not the reverse. States are not agents of federal power; they are the principals who delegated limited powers to federal authorities.
- Brutus would find grim vindication. His warnings about federal absorption of state authority—warnings dismissed as paranoid—now appear prescient.
- Cato would recognize his nightmare scenario: a single person claiming authority over the very elections that are supposed to hold power accountable.
- And Jefferson—the man who became President and understood its temptations—would see exactly what he warned against: a single step beyond constitutional boundaries, opening a boundless field of power no longer susceptible of any definition. He would see public servants at such a distance from their constituents that detection becomes impossible, inviting corruption, plunder, and waste.
The founders disagreed on much. But they shared one conviction that transcended their differences: power over elections must be distributed, checked, and accountable. Concentrate that power in any single authority—especially a single person—and you have not defended democracy. You have ended it.
Federal courts have already begun blocking executive attempts to seize election control, citing the Constitution’s clear allocation of power to states and Congress. The founders’ design is holding—for now.
But the design only holds if citizens understand it and defend it. The men who wrote the Constitution could not have imagined the technology of 21st-century elections. But they understood something timeless about power: those who control the mechanisms of accountability will eventually escape accountability altogether.
That is why they gave election control to the states. That is why they excluded the President from the Elections Clause entirely. That is why, across all their bitter disagreements, Hamilton and Jefferson, Madison and Brutus, Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike would stand united against what is now being proposed.
If only they knew what we would face.
But in a sense, they did know.
They wrote it down.
The question is whether we will read it.
— — —
Primary Sources
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 4
The Federalist Papers, Nos. 45, 52, 59, 60, 61 (Hamilton and Madison)
The Anti-Federalist Papers (“Brutus” and “Cato”)
Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, February 15, 1791 (Library of Congress, Thomas Jefferson Papers)
Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger, August 13, 1800 (Library of Congress, Thomas Jefferson Papers)
Copyright © 2026 by Charles Cranston Jett
All Rights Reserved